DYNAMIC-SPATIAL MANAGEMENT OF COASTAL AQUIFERS by Kan, Iddo et al.
םילשוריב תירבעה הטיסרבינואה 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem         
 
 
להנמו תיאלקח הלכלכל הקלחמה 
The Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Management 
תיאלקח הלכלכב רקחמל זכרמה 























םיאצמנ הקלחמה ירבח לש םירמאמ  
םהלש תיבה ירתאב םג :  
 
Papers by members of the Department 
can be found in  their home sites: 
http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/economics/indexe.html 
 
ת . ד  . 12  ,  תובוחר 76100       P.O. Box 12, Rehovot 76100 
       
 Dynamic-spatial management of coastal
aquifers
Iddo Kan¤ Arie Leizarowitz y Yacov Tsurz
August 26, 2007
Abstract
We analyze the management of a coastal aquifer under seawater
intrusion using distributed control methods. The aquifer's state is
taken as the water head elevation, which varies with time and in space
since extraction, natural recharge and lateral water °ows vary with
time and in space. The water head, in turn, induces a temporal-
spatial seawater intrusion process, which changes the volume of fresh
water in the aquifer. Under reasonable conditions we show that the
optimal state converges to a steady state process that is constant in
time. We characterize the optimal steady state process in terms of a
standard control problem (in space) and o®er a tractable algorithm to
solve for it.
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11 Introduction
Most economic models of natural resource exploitation are dynamic in na-
ture, accounting for the evolution of the resource stock over time as a result
of human use and natural regeneration processes. Often the resource state
evolves in time but varies across space as well. Examples include: (i) coastal
aquifers under seawater intrusion (SWI) that depends on the aquifer's water
head, which varies across space as a result of the spatial variability of pump-
ing policies; (ii) the density of ¯sh population that evolves over time due to
harvesting and net regeneration and changes from location to location as a
result of migration due to competition for food; (iii) the age-density distri-
bution of a forest; and (iv) the concentration of air, soil, or water pollution.
The resource state in such cases varies with time and with the spatial loca-
tion. Adding the spatial dimension turns the equation describing the motion
of the resource state from an ordinary di®erential equation to a partial di®er-
ential equation and a management policy entails exploitation rates that are
time and space dependent. Consequently, the resource management prob-
lem changes from that of a standard optimal control to distributed control
(see [4]). In this paper we apply distributed control methods to study the
management of coastal aquifers under SWI.
Optimal groundwater management is associated with a wide range of con-
siderations, such as temporal and spatial hydrological processes, external im-
pacts of surface activities on water quality, stock-dependent extraction costs,
2uncertainty with respect to natural recharge and °ows between adjacent wa-
ter bodies, and the e®ect of market structure in the water economy. There
is an extensive economic literature on the subject. Early studies [3, 2] inves-
tigated optimal groundwater withdrawals from a single-cell aquifer. Welfare
implications of extraction under common property and groundwater property
rights were studied by [8]. Knapp and Feinerman [16] extended the spatial
framework to a multi-cell aquifer, analyzing optimal steady-state solutions.
Other extensions comprise game theoretic strategic behavior in extraction
[21, 22] and conjunctive use of surface and groundwater [27, 17]. Many stud-
ies examine dynamic implications of agricultural activities on groundwater
quality. Knapp et al. [18] and Shah et al. [25] viewed uncon¯ned aquifers
as an exhaustible resource for storage of saline drainage, where subsurface
drainage-system constitutes a backstop technology. Other studies explicitly
introduce groundwater quality as a state variable [11, 26, 6, 15]. Kim et al.
[14] consider the time lag in the e®ect of deep percolation on groundwater
quality, while [13] incorporates the spread of impact over time due to the
spatial nature of groundwater °ows toward aquifer outlets.
We study optimal management of coastal aquifers where the groundwater
stock determines the extent of SWI, hence also the e®ective aquifer capac-
ity containing fresh water. Cummings [5] was among the ¯rst to develop a
generalized model of groundwater extraction under the presence of SWI. He
considered water transfers to intruded areas as a mitigation strategy. Tsur
and Zemel [28, 29] analyzed SWI as an adverse abrupt event, occurring at
3an uncertain date due to conditions that are not fully understood, where the
exploitation policy a®ects the occurrence probability. They characterized op-
timal management under various types of events (reversible and irreversible)
and uncertainty (endogenous and exogenous). Reinelt [24] considered the
SWI as a deterministic and gradual process. He analyzed optimal extraction
regimes from a con¯ned coastal aquifer while incorporating both the tem-
poral and spatial dimensions of the problem. Reinelt [24] utilized Darcy's
law to express the dynamic-spatial management problem in terms of partial
di®erential equations of motion. However, instead of characterizing the opti-
mal policy analytically, he resorted to numerical methods based on discrete
approximations.
The paucity of analytical dynamic-spatial models in economic literature
is likely due to their complexity. There are but a few examples of such models
in resource management contexts, including [23] on forest harvesting, [1] on
river contamination by runo®, [32] on capital under environmental taxes,
[9] on fertilizing-driven runo®, and [12] on cropping under the in°uence of
pathogens. Drawing on recent results by Leizarowitz [19], we develop such a
model for coastal aquifers.
The aquifer's state and its motion in time and space are characterized in
Section 2. Section 3 formulates the dynamic-spatial management problem
as a distributed control problem. In Section 4 we characterize the optimal
extraction policy in time and space and show (under reasonable assumptions)
that the system converges to a steady state in which the various processes
4do not change over time. In Section 5 we characterize the steady state policy
in terms of a standard control problem in space. In section 6 we o®er a
computationally tractable procedure to solve the distributed control problem
(the steady state policy and the transition to it). Section 7 concludes.
2 Dynamic-spatial formulation
We consider a homogeneous, uncon¯ned coastal aquifer extending east of a
north-south coastline. Let x measure the distance from the sea: 0 · x · L,
where x = 0 at the seashore and x = L at the eastern end of the aquifer. Let
F(x) measure the north-south length of the aquifer at location x. Consider
a strip of the aquifer at location x with sides F(x) and ¢x, denoted Dx(¢x)
(see Figure 1). Wells are distributed at density ¸(x) per unit area, thus
Dx(¢x) contains approximately ¸(x)F(x)¢x wells.1
Figure 1
Our model is time dependent and we denote by g(x;t)F(x)¢x the rate
of water extraction from Dx(¢x) at time t (dimension m3t¡1; m= meter).
The natural replenishment (recharge) rate at Dx(¢x) and time t due to
rainfall, deep percolation, and subsurface °ows between the aquifer and
other groundwater bodies, denoted r(h(x;t)), is assumed to be dependent
1When the north-south length of the aquifer is large, the variability along this direction
may be substantial, violating the homogeneity assumption. Often, as in the Israeli case,
the aquifer can be divided into homogenous sections (or cells). Each section is then treated
separately and later integrated into a model of the whole aquifer. Here we assume that
the homogeneity assumptions holds.
5on the average water-head level h(x;t) in Dx(¢x) above the sea level. Thus,
r(h(x;t))F(x)¢x is the average net external recharge at Dx(¢x). Net ex-
ternal out°ow from Dx(¢x) during [t;t + ¢t] is thus
[g(x;t) ¡ r(h(x;t))]F(x)¢x¢t:
Let ¹(x;t)F(x)¢x represent the rate of net lateral °ow at Dx(¢x), i.e.,
net °ow from its contiguous sections. Lateral °ows are driven by changes in
the water head h(x;t) and are speci¯ed below. The water balance equation
for Dx(¢x) during [t;t + ¢t] is given by
[h(x;t+¢t)¡h(x;t)]Á(x)F(x)¢x = [r(h(x;t))¡g(x;t)+¹(x;t)]F(x)¢x¢t;
(2.1)
where Á(x) is the aquifer's porosity parameter.
We now specify the lateral °ow term ¹(x;t). Let Q(x;t) be the rate of
water (m3t¡1) going through the rectangle of sides F(x) and h(x;t) from one















¢x + o(¢x) (2.3)
where · is the aquifer's hydraulic conductivity. Thus, ignoring o(¢x) terms,
























When F(x) varies "slowly" with x, such that
jF0(x)j
F(x) is negligibly small, ¹(x;t)










we obtain, recalling (2.1) and (2.5),
Á(x)
h(x;t)
Ht(x;t) = ·Hxx(x;t) + ·
F 0(x)
F(x)
Hx + 2(r(h(x;t)) ¡ g(x;t)): (2.7)
The boundary conditions associated with equation (2.7) include the initial
water head levels
h(x;0) = h0(x); 0 · x · L (2.8)
and appropriate boundary conditions at x = 0 and x = L, such as
h(0;t) = 0; hx(0;t) = b0(t); hx(L;t) = bL(t); 0 · t · L: (2.9)
7We still have to combine this dynamics for h, expressed as a nonlinear
parabolic equation, with the reward functional over a long time period. This
will yield a distributed optimal control problem for the agriculture-economic
system which we study. Once this is formulated precisely, we will indicate
the method of solution that we propose.
A desirable feature of the distributed optimal control that we formulated
is that when considered on long time intervals the corresponding optimal
solutions will tend to some steady state equilibrium, which doesn't depend
on the initial state. The state equation (2.7) is nonlinear, and in general
establishing convergence to a steady state for nonlinear equations is a di±cult
task. Nevertheless, we managed to establish this under the assumption that
the recharge function r is linear in H:
r(h) = a0 ¡ bh
2 = a0 ¡ bH; 0 · H · a0=b: (2.10)
The existence of a unique steady state equilibrium z? is considered in sec-
tion 4. Once this is established then the characterization of z? follows from
standard results in ¯nite dimensional calculus of variations.
3 The management problem
The average water head (relative to sea level) at strip Dx(¢x) is represented
by the function h(x;t). It induces induces a seawater intrusion function f(h),
such that at time t length f(h(x;t)) out of the whole length of Dx(¢x) is
8saline, and the length F(x) ¡ f(x) is fresh.2 The number of fresh water
wells in location x is [F(x) ¡ f(h(x;t))]¸(x)¢x and, if water is extracted
only from fresh water wells, then the extraction rate per well in location x










so that at time t and location x the length µ(x;h(x;t))F(x) is saline. Using






Suppressing the dependence of µ on the x variable we suppose that µ(h) is
monotone decreasing, satis¯es 0 · µ(h) · 1 and is such that
µ(0) ¼ 1 and µ(h) = 0 for h > hM
for some constant hM.
We assume that the extraction cost per (operating) well depends both on
the water head h and on the per-well extraction rate e, and denote it c(h;e).
The extraction cost in the rectangular strip of edges ¢x and [1 ¡ µ(h)]F(x)
2The speci¯cation of the intrusion function f(h) is based on the Ghyben-Herzberg
principle.
9is obtained from multiplying c(h;e) by the number of operating wells




c(h;e)[1 ¡ µ(x;h)]F(x)¸(x)dx: (3.3)
We assume that c(h;0) = 0 (extracting a zero rate doesn't in°ict cost),
c(h;e) is increasing and strictly convex in e, and is decreasing in h. We shall
use the following speci¯cations:





(®h + ¯)¹ (3.5)
for some positive constants a, ®, ¯ and ¹, and p > 1. Using (3.2) and (3.4),







The function µ(h) decreases monotonically and vanishes at h = hM, and
we have 0 · µ(h) · 1 for every 0 · h · hM, and h(0) ¼ 1. We choose for
µ(h) the form






where ® and ¯ are as in (3.5), and
0 < º < 1:
10Choosing the coe±cients ® and ¯ the same in (3.5) and (3.7) is very helpful
in rendering our analysis and our computations tractable. We have, how-
ever, enough freedom provided by the other parameters a, º and ¹ to match
experimental data with the expressions (3.5) and (3.7).









a(®¹ h + ¯)º(p¡1)
¸(x)p¡1 : (3.9)
The dependence of the integrand in (3.8) on the variables (h;g) is of the form
©(h;g) =
gp
(®h + ¯)½; (3.10)
where ½ = ¹ + º(p ¡ 1). We need the following simple result:
Lemma 3.1 Let ©(¢;¢) be the function in (3:10) with ½;p > 0, and consider
it on the domain h;g > 0. If
½ + 1 < p
then ©(¢;¢) is strictly convex. If ½+1 = p then © is convex. Moreover, under





H + ¯)½ (3.11)
is convex in (H;g).
11Proof We compute the second order derivatives of ©:
©gg =
p(p ¡ 1)gp¡2
(®h + ¯)½ ; ©hh =
®2½(½ + 1)gp
(®h + ¯)½+2 and ©gh = ¡
®p½gp¡1
(®h + ¯)½+1:
We have then that
©gg¢©hh¡(©gh)
2 =
®2p(p ¡ 1)½(½ + 1) ¡ (®p½)2
(®h + ¯)2½+2 g
2p¡2 =
®2½p(p ¡ ½ ¡ 1)g2p¡2
(®h + ¯)2½+2
and the assertion concerning © follows.
























where ¢ > 0. Using these expressions and the positivity of ¢ we obtain
ªgg ¢ ªHH ¡ (ªgH)
2 =
®2½p(p ¡ ½ ¡ 1)g2p¡2
4H(®
p




H + ¯)½ > 0
since both terms are positive. The proof of the Lemma is complete.
Employing the lemma to the function forming the integrand in (3.8) we





if 0 < º < 1. We will assume henceforth that (3.12) holds.
12We turn now to the bene¯t expression. The extracted water g(x;t) gener-
ates the instantaneous bene¯t U(g(x;t)) at time t, where the bene¯t function
U(¢) is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave. An extraction policy
¡ = fg(x;t) : 0 · x · L;0 · t < 1g
is feasible if it satis¯es:
0 · g(x;t) · k(x); 0 · h(x;t) · hM(x); 0 · x · L; t ¸ 0; (3.13)
for some function k(x) that expresses the maximal extraction capacity, and





U(g(x;t))F(x)dx ¡ C(t)dt (3.14)
subject to (2.7) and (3.13), for prescribed initial conditions (2.8) and bound-
ary conditions (2.9).3 The cost C(t) in (3.14) is given by (3.8).
In our model the dynamics are described by equation (2.7), where the
variable h(x;t) is the state of the system at time t and location x, g(x;t)
is the distributed control variable, and these variables should satisfy (3.13).
We will henceforth assume the following form for the utility function:
U(g) = bg
°









with ½ as the time rate of discount. The discounted problem turns out to be more techni-
cally involved and is left for future research.


















In (3.16) the exponent in the denominator is
½ = ¹ + º(p ¡ 1);
which by (3.12) satis¯es ½ + 1 < p. In view of Lemma 3.1 it follows that





















and note, recalling Lemma 3.1, that it is strictly concave in (h;g). The
aquifer management problem is to ¯nd the feasible extraction policy
¡ = fg(x;t); 0 · x · L; 0 · t · Tg
for some large but ¯nite T that maximizes the payo® subject to (2.7)-(2.9).
144 Existence of and convergence to steady state
We consider the maximization of the undiscounted total reward R(T;g) in
(3.17) subject to (2.7), and take the limit of R(T;g) as T increases to in¯nity.




R(T;g). Actually we consider policies g? that in addition
to having maximal long-run average reward have the following property: For
every feasible policy g there exists a constant M such that
R(T;g
?) > R(T;g) ¡ M
for every T > 0. Such policies are called good policies (see [19]). In particular,
good policies have maximal long-run average reward.
In a steady state the various processes are independent of time. In this
section we show that good policies corresponding to the aquifer management
problem converges to a steady state. Our analysis relies on properties estab-
lished in [19]. To keep our work self contained, we brie°y summarize (in the
next subsection) the main result on which we base our steady state analysis
(a complete account can be found in [19]). In subsection 4.2 we apply this
result to the present aquifer problem.
4.1 Steady state properties in a class of distributed
control problems
We present the results in terms of the notations used in [19]. Consider
a distributed control system where the state is represented by a function
15z(x;t) of the spatial variable x and the time t ¸ 0, where 0 · x · L for
some L > 0. The in¯nite-dimension state vector z(t) at time t, de¯ned in
terms of the function x 7! z(x;t), belongs to a separable Hilbert space H, and
the in¯nite-dimension control vector u(t), de¯ned in terms of x 7! u(x;t),
belongs to a separable Hilbert space E.4





= (®(x)zx(x;t))x + °(x)z(x;t) + u(x;t); (4.1)
for a continuously di®erentiable, positive function ®(¢), and °(¢) is a con-
tinuous function which is either positive or negative on [0;L].5 We consider
equation (4.1) with an initial condition
z(x;0) = ³(x); 0 · x · L; (4.2)
³(¢) is di®erentiable, with boundary conditions of the form
a1z(0;t) + b1zx(0;t) = °1(t); a2z(L;t) + b2zx(L;t) = °2(t) (4.3)
4It is further assumed that
H = H1(0;L) = f»(¢) 2 L2(0;L) : the derivative »0(¢) belongs to L2(0;L)g;
that the space E is L2(0;L), and u(¢) is an L2 function from [0;T] into E, namely u(¢;¢) 2
L2((0;T);(0;L)) (see details in [19]).
5This equation is related to the porous medium equation
zt(x;t) = (zm)xx; m > 1
and its generalization, the ¯ltration equation,
zt(x;t) = (©(z))xx + f(x;t):
For a discussion of these equations see [30].
16for some constants a1, a2, b1 and b2, and for some continuous functions °1(¢)
and °2(¢) de¯ned for t ¸ 0.










F0(z(x;t);u(x;t)) being the instantaneous reward at location x and time t.
The function F(¢;¢) in (4.4) is concave and upper semi-continuous on H£E,
and satis¯es the coercivity condition
F(z;u) · a ¡ cjjzjj
2
H (4.5)
for given constants a > 0 and c > 0.
The problem we deal with is in¯nite horizon so that the reward expres-
sions JT are to be maximized as T ! 1. The optimality criterion that







De¯nition 4.1 A pair of functions (z(¢);u(¢)) : [0;1) 7! H £ E is admis-
sible pair if the following conditions hold:
(i) u(¢;¢) 2 L1([0;T]£[0;L]) for every ¯nite T > 0, namely u is measurable
17and bounded on every ¯nite rectangle [0;T] £ [0;L].
(ii) z(¢) : [0;1) 7! H is di®erentiable, and it satis¯es (4:1), (4:2), (4:3).
When considering the problem on the in¯nite time interval [0;1), we as-
sume that u 2 L1([0;1) £ [0;L]).
(iii) The function t 7! F(z(t);u(t)) is locally Lebesgue integrable on [0;1).
Using the above terminology we say that u? is a a good control if
JT(z(0);u
?(¢)) > JT(z(0);u(¢)) ¡ M
for some constant M, for every admissible control u(¢) and every T > 0. The
result below guarantees the existence of steady state for admissible good con-
trols. Another notion which is needed to phrase the steady state result is the
strong continuity with respect to the initial value and the non-homogeneous
term (the control u) in (4.1).
De¯nition 4.2 We say that the solutions of (4:1) depend strongly contin-
uously on the initial value and the non-homogeneous term if the following
holds. Suppose that f³kg1
k=1 is a sequence of initial values that converge
weakly in H1(0;L) to a limit ³, and for some ¯xed T > 0, the sequence
fukg1
k=1 converges weakly in L2 ([0;L] £ [0;T]) to u . Let zk(x;t) be the so-
lution of (4.1) corresponding to ³k and uk, and let z(x;t) be the solution
corresponding to ³ and u. Then
zk(x;t) ! z(x;t) as k ! 1 (4.6)
point-wise for almost every (x;t) 2 [0;L] £ [0;T].
18The following steady state result appears in [19, Theorem 3.4]:
Theorem 4.1 Assume that F in (4:4) is strictly concave. Moreover, suppose
that the solutions of (4:1) depend strongly continuously on the initial value









F(z(t);u(t))dt ¡ M (4.7)
for some M > 0 and every admissible pair (z(t);u(t)). Then, there exists a
steady state ¹ z such that
z
?(t) * ¹ z weakly as t ! 1: (4.8)
4.2 Steady state properties of the aquifer problem
In applying the above result to the coastal aquifer problem we ¯rst need to















(a0 ¡ g(x;t)): (4.9)
To show that (4.9) is equivalent to (4.1) use z(x;t) = H(x;t) and u(x;t) =















= (~ ®(»)~ z»)» + ~ °(»)z + ~ u(»;t);
19which has the same form as (4.1).
In fact, utilizing the present structure (particularly, Lemma 3.1), the
following stronger property is veri¯ed in [19]:
Proposition 4.1 Corresponding to the distributed control problem of maxi-
mizing (3:17) subject to (2:7) and the side conditions (2:8)-(2:9), there exists
a unique steady state to which any good policy converges in the long run.
5 Characterization of the steady-state








for an integrand L which is concave in (H;g) for every ¯xed x, then the
steady state problem is to maximize
^ R(^ g) =
Z L
0
L(x; ^ H; ^ g)dx (5.2)









+ a0 ¡ b ^ H(x) ¡ ^ g(x) = 0 (5.3)
and side conditions, say the values of ^ H and ^ Hx both at x = 0 and x = L.
For the special reward expression introduced above we have, recalling (3.18),





^ H + ¯)½
^ g
p: (5.4)










+ a0 ¡ b ^ H(x) (5.5)
in (5.2) and (5.4), obtaining a standard calculus of variations problem for the
function ^ H(x) on 0 · x · L. The Euler-Lagrange equation for this problem
is the following fourth order, boundary values ordinary di®erential equation
(see, e.g., [7, Chapter 2])












dx2 (L^ g) = 0 (5.6)
where ^ H(0) = 0, ^ H0(0), ^ H(L) and ^ H0(L) are prescribed boundary values.
Thus, e.g., the term
d2
dx2 (L^ g) that appears in (5.6), involves the deriva-
tive of the function L(x; ^ H; ^ g) with respect to its third variable ^ g, namely
L^ g(x; ^ H; ^ g), evaluated at the triplet (x; ^ H(x); ^ g(x)), where ^ g is as in (5.5).
This is a function of x alone, and its second derivative with respect to x is
the quantity that appears in (5.6). This term yields expressions that include
the fourth order derivative ^ H0000(x), so that (5.5) is a non-linear, fourth order,
boundary value equation.
6 Computation
It turns out that solving the Euler-Lagrange equation (5.6) is quite compli-
cated, and the result thus obtained is not transparent. We will next take
advantage of the structure of the problem, in particular the concavity of the
integrand in (5.2), to o®er a computation procedure of the steady state and
the transition to it.
216.1 Steady state
The aquifer is divided into a small number of sub-regions N1, N2,...,Nm,
where Nj is de¯ned by
Nj = fcj · x · djg; 1 · j · m;
where c1 = 0, dm = L and dj < cj+1, and where the following holds:
cj+1 ¡ dj
L
<< 1 for every 1 · j · m ¡ 1:
We suppose that within each region the characteristic feature of the aquifer
(recharge r(H(x)), porosity Á(x), wells distribution ¸(x)) are homogeneous
and do not vary with x. Thus the recharge parameters b(x) and a0(x) are
labeled aj and bj according to the region they describe.
Our approach is to solve for the steady state within each region separately,
and then combine all these solutions together to a steady state solution on
the whole aquifer by considering the narrow strips
Sj = fdj · x · cj+1g; 1 · j · m ¡ 1
as boundary layers. However, since these strips are very narrow, and the
system is actually discrete and not continuous, we don't have to be very
precise as for the exact de¯nition of the solution in these boundary layers
small strips.
We next focus on a particular sub-region Nj. Let ^ g(x) be a control with
a corresponding state ^ H(x), cj · x · dj, such that (5.3) holds in Nj. We

















is the area of the region Nj. The reward expression associated with the pair

















where we suppress the dependence of Rj on ^ H since ^ H is determined by ^ g
via equation (5.3). We denote by Lj the restriction of L to Nj (recall (3.18)),
and in view of the concavity of the integrand Lj( ^ H; ^ g) in (6.8) it follows from
Jensen inequality that
Rj(^ g) · vjLj( ¹ H; ¹ g): (6.9)
This implies that the constant pair (¹ g; ¹ H) yields a better reward than (^ g; ^ H),
provided that it is admissible, namely that it satis¯es (5.3). But a constant
pair (g0;H0) satis¯es (5.3) if and only if
g0 + bH0 ¡ a0 = 0: (6.10)
The non-constant pair (^ g;^ h), however, does satisfy (5.3), and integrating this
equation on the interval [cj;dj] and dividing the result by vj yields
g0 + bh0 ¡ a0 =
·
2vj
[ ^ Hx(dj) ¡ ^ Hx(cj)]: (6.11)
23The right hand side of (6.11) is very small, since ^ Hx = 2^ h(x)^ h0(x) and we
have ^ h(x) << F(x) and ^ h0(x) ¼ 0 due to the assumption that Nj is homo-
geneous and depends weakly on x. Hence for any practical consideration the
pair (¹ g;¹ h) may be considered as an admissible pair. Thus in view of (6.9),
when addressing the maximization of (6.8) subject to (5.3) we may restrict
attention only to constant pairs. Namely, the steady state maximizer of the
problem on Nj is obtained as the solution to
Maximize Lj( ^ H; ^ g) subject to ^ g + b ^ H = a0; (6.12)
or equivalently, the solution of
Maximize Lj( ^ H;a0 ¡ b ^ H) over all positive ^ H: (6.13)
The function L( ^ H;a0 ¡b ^ H) is a strictly concave function of ^ H, and it has a
unique solution, which we denote ^ Hj with a corresponding constant control
^ gj = a0 ¡ b ^ Hj:
We solve (6.12) (or (6.13)) for each region Nj, and de¯ne an admissible pair
(^ g; ^ H) on 0 · x · L as follows:
(i) On Nj we de¯ne
^ g = ^ gj and ^ H = ^ Hj: (6.14)
(ii) On Sj we choose any ^ Hj(x) such that ^ Hj is continuous at dj and cj+1,
and then use (5.3) to de¯ne ^ gj(x). E.g., we may take ^ Hj(x) as a third order
polynomial such that in addition to the continuity at dj and cj+1 it satis¯es
^ H
0
j(cj) = ^ H
0
j(dj) = 0:
24Since the strips Sj are very narrow compared to the aquifer's length L,
the exact de¯nition of (^ g; ^ H) on the strips Sj is not really signi¯cant, and we
may consider the pair (^ g; ^ H) de¯ned in (6.14) and in (ii) above as the steady
state optimal solution.
6.2 Transition to the steady state
We suppose that from a certain time T on the state approaches the steady
state solution ( ^ H; ^ g), and we have to solve for the transition period 0 · t · T.
We study this transition for each region Nj separately. Let (g(x;t);H(x;t))
be any pair satisfying (2.7) with recharge r = a ¡ bH, and we consider this
equation for cj · x · dj.
In this subsection we chose the state variable to be h rather than H. This
simpli¯es the analysis, since when integrating (2.7), we obtain an equation
for the average of h, with a small perturbation term, which may be ignored.
This is equation (6.15) below. In this discussion of transition to steady state,
it is more convenient to use the variable h, since then, under our assumptions,
H practically disappears from the equation, and we are left with an equation
that involves only the average of h, not averages of H or its derivatives.






[Fj(Hx(dj) ¡ Hx(cj))] + aj ¡ bj¹ hj(t) ¡ ¹ gj(t) (6.15)




25in (6.15) is very small, and we consider it as practically zero. We thus obtain
the following dynamics on Nj:
¹ h
0
j(t) = ®j ¡ ¯j¹ hj(t) ¡ ±j¹ gj(t) (6.16)











In addition, the following end conditions should be satis¯ed:
¹ hj(0) = h0;j; hj(T) = h
?
j: (6.17)
We have to maximize the reward (3.17) over all the admissible pairs (gj;hj),
namely all the pairs that satisfy (6.16) and (6.17). Using again the concavity
of L(g;h) and Jensen inequality, integrating (3.17) on cj · x · dj for each




L(¹ gj(t);¹ hj(t))dt: (6.18)
We compare an arbitrary admissible pair (gj;hj) to its associated average
pair (¹ gj;¹ hj), and in view of (6.18) we may focus on maximizing ¹ R(T) over
admissible pairs which do not depend on the x variable. We are thus led to




L(¹ gj(t);¹ hj(t))dt (6.19)
subject to (6.16) and the edge conditions (6.17). This is a standard optimal
control problem, and we compute a solution by employing the Pontryagin
26Maximum principle. We thus de¯ne the Hamiltonian
Hj(g;h;´) = Lj(g;h) + ´(®j ¡ ¯j¹ h ¡ ±j¹ g); (6.20)











j(t) = ¯j´j ¡
@Lj
@h
(¹ gj;¹ hj): (6.21)
Moreover, the optimal control ¹ gj maximizes the function
g 7! H(g;¹ h;´j);
and in view of (3.18) it is the unique solution of
°g
°¡1 ¡ pDg




(®j¹ hj + ¯j)½:
Thus ¹ gj is the solution of
pDg
p¡° + ±j´g
1¡° ¡ ° = 0; (6.22)
which we denote by Ã(¹ hj;´j). We substitute the control
¹ gj(t) = Ã(¹ hj(t);´j(t))
in (6.16) and (6.21) and solve this system of equations subject to the bound-
ary conditions (6.17)
27This way we obtain for each region an optimal transition solution
(¹ gj(t);¹ hj(t)) on [0;T], which has the edge values h0;j and ^ hj in Nj. We
then use some interpolation to de¯ne the transition solution on the strips Sj.
Since these are very narrow compared to the length L, the exact de¯nition
of the transition control is not signi¯cant, and practically the de¯nition we
use yields an optimal transition solution.
7 Cunclusion
We analyzed dynamic-spatial management of a coastal aquifer under seawater
intrusion using distributed control methods. We showed that the optimal
policy converges over time to a spatially-dependent steady state function.
This convergence property holds for a class of distributed control models
which contains our coastal aquifer problem. The steady state function is
obtained as solution of an ordinary control problem in space. Since analytical
characterization of the steady state function and the transition to it are in
general not available, we o®ered an approximation algorithm to calculate the
optimal policy.
Our analysis abstracts in two important ways. First, the spatial variable
in our model is single dimension, measuring the west-east distance from the
coastal edge of the aquifer towards inland. Second, we assume a zero rate
discounting. It would be of interest to consider a 2-dimensional space, by
adding a variable that measures the north-south location, and to allow for a
positive discount rate. These extensions are left for future research.
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Figure 1. A 3-dimensional view of the coastal aquifer.PREVIOUS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
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